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Summary 
A 1.5C global average target implies that we should no longer focus on merely incremental emissions reductions from the 
electricity system, but rather on fundamentally re-envisaging a system that, sooner rather than later, becomes carbon free. 
Many low carbon technologies are surpassing mainstream predictions for both uptake and cost reduction. Their 
deployment is beginning to be disruptive within established systems. ‘Smart technologies’ are being developed to address 
emerging challenges of system integration, but their rates of future deployment remain uncertain. 
We argue that transition towards a system that can fully displace carbon generation sources will require expanding the 
focus of our efforts beyond technical solutions. Recognising that change has social as well as technical dimensions, and 
that these interact strongly, we set out a socio-technical review that covers electricity infrastructure, citizens, business 
models and governance. It describes some of the socio-technical challenges that need to be addressed for the successful 
transition of existing electricity systems. 
We conclude that a socio-technical understanding of electricity system transitions offers new and better insights into the 
potential and challenges for rapid decarbonisation. 
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Introduction  
Rapid decarbonisation 
Delivering any acceptable target for long term warming requires rapid transformation of global energy systems that are 
responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions (1). Decarbonisation of the electricity sector is crucial and an early action 
is needed (2). Of course, electricity decarbonisation is not the entire problem for energy transition. However, there is 
general agreement that mitigation in other sectors will be more difficult and also that their decarbonisation may require a 
degree of electrification. A whole systems approach shows that early decarbonisation of electricity is essential, for both 
reasons. This paper therefore focusses on that challenge for electricity systems.  
A critical effect of shifting attention from a 2oC target to a 1.5oC target will be the need for faster energy system 
transformation (3), and therefore even higher priority for rapid electricity system transformation. However, our analysis is 
applicable to the rapid transformation required to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change in general, rather than 
any specific temperature target. 
Integration of renewable energy   
Variable (intermittent) renewables, in particular wind and solar, are now almost certain to be the major contributors to 
low carbon electricity supply. They are abundant resources and the lowest cost low carbon options almost everywhere 
(4,5). Nuclear power and fossil fuel generation with carbon capture and storage (CCS) have featured prominently in 
earlier discussion about electricity decarbonisation, including the IPCC AR5 report (1). However, it is increasingly clear 
that they cannot compete on cost with renewables, that they have other non-carbon environmental risks, and their 
development and build times are long. They are less suitable supply options in scenarios requiring very rapid 
decarbonisation.  
A number of global model outputs include high levels of electricity generation from a negative emissions technology, 
Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), by the second half of this century e.g. (6). However, these 
modelling processes have not fully considered the environmental, social and governance issues, which may be very 
problematic (7,8). More importantly for the purposes of our analysis, the technology is virtually unproven and cannot 
feasibly be scaled to make a significant global contribution on the timescales required for electricity system 
decarbonisation. Whether BECCS can play a major role in the long term or not, the first priority is rapid decarbonisation.  
At the rates of decarbonisation implied by a 1.5oC (or even a 2 oC) target, the scale of deployment of renewables is 
therefore a key challenge. Reducing total demand (below the counterfactual) will therefore be critical in constraining this 
scale and therefore increasing speed of decarbonisation. There is general agreement between integrated assessment 
models on this (9), as well as with other bottom up assessments (1). 
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The key problem for a rapid renewables transition is to integrate these variable resources into existing power systems. 
These challenges are already appearing in countries with high renewables penetrations (10); integration is increasingly the 
key constraint on speed of deployment. 
Variable renewable resources are also more distributed than conventional fossil fuelled power plants and many are 
connected to power systems at lower voltages, so that grid and system operation need to adapt. 
Electricity decarbonisation as a socio-technical issue/challenge 
This paper considers the challenges of a major transition to a low carbon electricity system powered by renewables. 
Although most of the literature on climate mitigation focusses on energy supply, there is increasing recognition that 
energy demand will also play a role (11). Indeed, energy efficiency improvement has historically played a larger role in 
mitigation than supply decarbonisation (1) and sectoral analyses indicate that there is still a very large potential (12). 
Energy demand is highly distributed and the outcome of interactions between people and technology.  The ‘demand side’, 
and human actors more generally, cannot be neglected in thinking about low carbon transitions. Major transitions involve 
co-evolution of technology, society and institutions, both generally (13,14) and specifically for electricity e.g. (15). 
Technology invention, development, adoption and adaptation involve individual, social and organisational learning 
(16,17). A technology, and still more a system, is never fully ‘achieved’ or ‘delivered’: it is continuously adapted in 
response to prevailing conditions.  
The role of an electricity system is to provide services for human activity and well-being. In a renewables-based 
electricity system, important human dimensions will include service expectations, knowledge and skills, technology 
acceptance (e.g. of extensive renewable generation, transmission lines and smart meters) and more active citizen 
engagement, for example in the deployment of decentralised generation (DG), distributed storage (DS) and demand 
response (DR). In this sense, technical change is ‘an irredeemably social process’ (18) and it is unhelpful to draw 
boundaries between the social and technical, hence the socio-technical approach that we adopt in this paper. 
It is also important to understand that decarbonisation is not the only energy-related social and political priority, nor even 
the main one in most jurisdictions. Access to electricity is a key Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), and the key 
energy policy goal in many developing countries. Where access can utilise new, cleaner technologies thereby 
‘leapfrogging’ the technologies of more industrialised countries, climate mitigation opportunities may be advanced (19). 
Where there is already universal access to electricity, security of supply is usually the critical political concern, with 
affordability also a key political goal, both for households and businesses. Universal access to electricity and affordable 
security of supply are therefore critical constraints on, and drivers of, any proposed transition.  
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Four categories of change 
Transitions tend to involve three categories of human actor – citizens, businesses and governance actors (20). In addition 
to these human actors, energy transitions are subject to path-dependency created by long-lived and capital- intensive 
physical infrastructure. Most notably, developed countries have electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure 
that was designed and built for large centralised generators to serve distributed and ‘passive’ loads. This socio-technical 
“lock-in” (21,22) has implications for future transitions. Distributed generation and control challenge these established 
systems and their operations. Given the socio-technical nature of the decarbonisation challenge, we treat the physical 
infrastructure on equal terms with human actors in the three roles identified above, analysing transition requirements 
around these four interacting categories (Figure 1): 
a. physical infrastructure (grids/distribution networks and systems), 
b. consumers/citizens, 
c. energy business models, and  
d. institutions and governance. 
The following sections describe the challenges of transitioning to a zero carbon electricity system for these categories.  
 
 
Figure 1 – four interacting categories of change required for rapid decarbonisation. 
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Infrastructure  
Wind and solar power can provide electricity that is sustainable, increasingly affordable, and can be deployed rapidly at 
scale. These resources therefore provide the best prospects for a rapid low-carbon electricity transition. Energy security, 
however, requires balancing the supply and demand of electricity. Wind and solar power depend on sources of energy 
that are variable and cannot be controlled. Although significant amounts of variable generation can be adopted without 
problems (23), it is self-evident that moving towards very high penetrations of variable resources raises balancing 
challenges. System balancing is one of the most fundamental challenges of transitioning to zero-carbon electricity 
systems. 
The variability of net demand (electricity demand minus non-controllable renewable electricity supply) is a critical issue. 
Net demand needs to be balanced on multiple timescales from seconds to seasons. Technically the key options for 
integrating variable renewables are known: flexible generation, storage, network enhancement (incl. interconnection), and 
flexible demand. 
Flexible generation is the best established and currently the most widely used. However, at very high levels of variable 
generation, it implies the construction of very large amounts of flexible plant, much of it with very low load factors (24), 
which makes them risky assets in which to invest. Furthermore, renewable electricity (other than biomass) has very low 
short run marginal costs. This exacerbates the “missing money problem” in classical wholesale markets, where generator 
revenues cannot cover investment in new capacity to ensure reliable supply (25,26). This has already impacted markets in 
a number of countries. The problem can be addressed in a number of ways, including by capacity markets. However, it 
also increases the need for flexibility (27). The ease with which fossil fuels can be stored and the relatively low cost of 
capacity have resulted in flexibility being readily available from thermal generators. The closure of such plant reduces 
system inertia (rotating mass of generators) and load-following ability at a time where variability of net demand is likely 
to increase. The best and cheapest approach to close this gap will involve thinking wider than supply. 
Energy storage is an alternative. Batteries, for example, are already being deployed at scale to provide ancillary services 
to grids (28). The energy to power ratio of batteries makes them well-suited to balancing over relatively short timescales 
e.g. seconds, hours and, possibly, days. While the cost of batteries is still high, it is falling rapidly (29) and battery 
deployment could see considerable growth. Batteries are, however, unsuitable for dealing with the long-term balancing 
(multiple-day, seasonal) also required in high renewables scenarios (24). Storage options for long-term balancing require 
high energy-to-power ratios and low energy costs. Chemical and thermal options are more plausible than batteries (30). 
Hydrogen storage has suitable characteristics but requires considerable research and development to reduce costs. In low 
carbon electricity systems, energy storage can provide an effective solution to short-term balancing but the technologies 
for cost effective long-term balancing are not proven. 
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Energy storage can balance net demand by shifting energy in time. Networks do the same by shifting energy in space. 
This is of benefit where the net demand time profiles of adjacent systems differ, so that their inter-connection aggregates 
their net demand and reduces its variability. At a large scale, interconnection is costly but has an important role in 
balancing short-term variability of net demand. Distance of interconnection is roughly analogous to duration of storage. 
Balancing using interconnection alone might imply trans-global interconnection: east-west connection for diurnal 
balancing and north-south for seasonal. The costs and geo-politics of such networks make them unlikely. 
In addition, there is a need for ‘smarter’ low voltage networks. In most jurisdictions, these are still predominantly passive  
(non-smart). Increased exposure to reverse flows from distributed generators and more variable large loads (such as 
electric vehicles) both increase the need for more active demand management at the low voltage network level, which 
requires changes in their control systems and the role of the network operators themselves (31). 
The final option, flexible demand, turns the traditional ‘predict and provide’ paradigm of power systems on its head, with 
demand responding instead to changes in supply. Evidence from existing dynamic electricity pricing schemes 
demonstrates that demand response can play a useful, if currently limited, role in managing short-term inter and intra-day 
variability (32–34). There is considerable research and development into how flexible demand can play a larger role in 
balancing, however, mainly focussed on electrifying domestic heat (35) and transport and using these as distributed 
thermal and electro-chemical storage. 
While these options can help reduce variability of net demand over short timescales, the electrification of heat in 
particular may increase the long-term seasonal balancing challenge, further increasing requirements for long-term 
seasonal flexibility. Until the costs of long-term storage technologies drop, it remains critical to encourage demand 
reduction, through energy efficiency and lifestyle changes. This requirement for both flexibility and reduction implies 
considerable changes to the status quo.  
It is important to note that all the newly built infrastructure on the demand side that a highly distributed smart grid implies 
has considerable potential to pre-shape behaviour and lifestyles in ways that may or may not support demand reduction or 
flexibility efforts (11). For example, households adopting solar panels in different countries can end up with quite 
different behavioural cues depending on the particular metering configurations and subsidies in place in their country 
(36). Early adopters of PV in Germany were incentivised to shift demand outside of daylight hours to export as much of 
their generation as possible, while the opposite has always been true in the UK. Meanwhile, solar adopters in USA under 
net metering arrangements are not incentivised to time-shift demand at all. Despite the large number of installations 
worldwide, the overall impact of solar PV on household energy consumption behaviour and how this varies socio-
demographically is not well understood, but is illustrative of the (sometimes unintended) behavioural consequences of 
low carbon infrastructural changes on the demand side. 
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Consumers and citizens  
The traditional (usually implicit) conception of an electricity consumer is as passive recipient and purchaser of a 
commodity (the kWh), and someone whose choices and actions are limited to (a) switching electrical equipment on and 
off, and (b) a choice of tariff and, perhaps, a choice of supplier. As innovations in demand or supply are expected to be 
technical or regulatory in nature, the consumer’s role a largely reactive one: to invest in new technology and adapt to new 
infrastructure or market arrangements (37,38).  
This account of consumers is challenged when we consider the extent to which electricity systems rely on networks of 
distributed actors, their role in shaping demand. This is becoming more significant as electricity systems increasingly 
involve distributed resources, control, network infrastructure, participation and governance (39). The socio-technical 
energy research literature points to the dangers of assuming that consumers are passive participants in energy systems or 
(worse) that they are error-prone obstacles in the path of technical progress. This approach tends to assume that human 
understanding and activity can be ‘edited out’ of energy management, for example through highly-automated smart 
homes, although the evidence to date is that this is often ineffective and can be counterproductive (40,41). The growing 
body of research into energy systems as socio-technical entities offers constructive and flexible ways of recognising and 
analysing relationships between people, technology and activities (42–44). 
Electricity demand is shaped by demand for the services it provides. In a number of countries, notably in the EU, 
electricity consumption has fallen over recent years (45). Technological improvements such as more efficient appliances 
and lighting have undoubtedly been important (46), but routine activities and expectations for energy services also have 
to be taken into account when attributing changes in demand (44). Changes are not simply a matter of individual choice 
either. For example, in Japan, more relaxed dress codes for office workers in summer have had a considerable impact on 
demand, particularly at peak times (47) and there have been substantial, durable demand reductions in the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster (48). Social norms and citizen-like responses to supply limitations both played a major part in 
bringing about these changes. Analysis of energy system evolution also shows the significance of networks of actors who 
between them bring about change or maintain the status quo (49,50): some striking recent analyses highlight the ways in 
which ‘middle actors’ may have the agency and capacity to bring about change because of their position in energy 
systems and the knowledge and connections they can bring to bear on a situation (51). 
These considerations demonstrate the centrality of human actors in electricity systems and also some ways in which 
humans are more than passive consumers, even in relatively traditional systems. As they become more  highly distributed, 
the operational challenges are likely to increase somewhat: systems will need to cope with changes in demand, supply 
mix, physical elements, rules and personnel over timescales ranging from milliseconds to decades. This will need 
reformed governance (discussed below) and that implies a need to recognise energy users as contributors and citizens, not 
simply consumers.  
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The nature of citizenship/involvement ranges from demand management by individuals to highly sophisticated forms of 
prosumption, community energy and involvement in planning issues (52,53). The dramatic rise of distributed generation 
in recent years, especially solar photovoltaics, has resulted in a whole new category of actors – prosumers  – who are both 
consumers and producers. There is some evidence that prosumption increases with a sense of energy citizenship (54). To 
date there is less experience with distributed electricity storage, although mass market products are now being sold. 
Demand response is a growing phenomenon, first practiced only with major industrial electricity users but now involving 
small organisations and individual consumers. The spread of smart metering makes demand response viable at scale, 
whether this takes place in response to dynamic pricing or a knowledge of system conditions, or through direct external 
control of some loads (33,39). The importance of trust between customer and supplier, customer education and feedback 
and user-friendly tariffs and technology are highlighted by a number of authors (55–57): effective demand response 
emerges from constructive relations between consumers-as-citizens, suppliers and system operators, technologies, 
knowledge and skills. 
Given the need for major increases in the deployment of energy efficiency measures, demand response, distributed 
generation and distributed storage, urgent change is still needed in the high-consuming economies. While the trend 
towards more distributed assets, activity and control in electricity systems is generally welcomed as part of a low-carbon 
transition, it raises important equity issues. In many countries, distributed generation seems likely to be a key enabler of 
cost-effective access to electricity. But there are also risks  associated with DG in countries with established grids, 
notably of rising network charges leading to ‘grid defection’ by customers able to invest in their own generating capacity, 
and prohibitive costs of supply for others who are trapped between the high cost of maintaining a residual grid and the 
cost of ‘going it alone’. There is also the risk in hot climates that the growth in air-conditioned buildings will produce 
dysfunctional systems that are unable to cope with peak demands and with pronounced inequalities between those who 
can afford high standards of service and those who cannot and who may, moreover, be suffering from ‘heat island’ effects 
exacerbated by air conditioning (58). A key question is whether new business models evolve to capture benefits primarily 
for individuals or for wider society. The former could lead to serious equity challenges and overall higher system costs 
(increasing the risk of ‘grid defection’), while the latter raises questions about cost/benefit attribution. The concept of 
energy citizenship is relevant in this debate. 
A smart grid – that is, an electricity grid combined with an ICT network – allows system balancing (technical operation), 
time dependent price signals (commercial operation) and real time information to assist user engagement (social 
operation). Smart meters with the ability to measure and communicate consumption and generation in near-real-time are 
increasingly being deployed in many countries for various reasons, including enabling DR, DG and DS. There is some 
evidence of benefits in terms of better customer feedback, reduced demand and DR in countries with metering 
programmes designed to achieve these (56). However there are also substantial challenges, including data 
security/privacy and cyber-security (59,60). 
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The scale of the potential for DR that could be enabled by smart grids is large (61,62) and there is potential for such 
developments to enable capacity and flexibility goals to be met by distributed resources. However, significant uncertainty 
remains about the extent to which this potential can be realised, given the many geographical, social, physical and 
regulatory variables involved. Smart data and ICT solutions by themselves do not deliver increased flexibility, but merely 
enable access to flexibility that may or may not be forthcoming from energy service users. A smart washing machine is 
still subject to social schedules, conventions and preferences that dictate its operation, sometimes within highly 
constrained boundaries. The desired flexibility might therefore be less constrained by technology than by social norms 
and conventions, such as working hours and dress codes (63). Issues like this cannot be addressed when energy users are 
thought of purely as consumers; as citizens and actors, though, they take their place as agents in transition. 
Business models 
The business model of the traditional utility (or vertically integrated electricity retailer) is increasingly problematic. The 
growth of the ‘missing money’ problem (25) has had observable business impacts, with declining profitability for 
incumbent companies. As reliance on wholesale market prices becomes increasingly problematic there is a need, and the 
potential, to look at the many new value streams in a decarbonised system. Some of these are in electricity markets, e.g. 
capacity, flexibility and the potential to address grid congestion, where demand side investments can contribute, for 
example through DR, DG and DS (27,64–66). Some others investments are, by definition, on the demand side, for 
example in end-use efficiency, heating and transport systems (67,68). All of these need to be financed, manufactured, 
installed, operated (69). So there is a wide diversity of potential new business models in decarbonising the electricity 
system, and the required size of some is large. 
Electric utilities and vertically integrated generation/retailers are the traditional aggregators of energy demand. Future 
markets seem likely to require similar aggregation of capacity and flexibility resources from decentralised producers, i.e. 
of DG, DR and DS, which offer potential value streams to energy users, grid companies and system operators. In 
principle the incumbent companies could develop their business models to incorporate new value streams, even without 
being regulated to do so, as these new services do not necessarily reduce demand for the core business kWh commodity. 
In practice, new entrants such as Sonnen, Tesla, Stem, Sunverge, and Green Charge Networks, have largely taken the 
lead, due to their more flexible business practices. However, incumbents retain the advantages of a large customer base 
and expertise in wholesale markets, so it would be unwise to think they will easily give way to new entrants. Many 
leading European energy companies, notably E.On, Innogy and DONG, have changed, or are changing, their fundamental 
business models towards a stronger focus on renewable generation and grid development. They are also including value 
added services to their existing customers, particularly around DR, which requires relatively limited investment and is 
amenable to central control, and thus is relatively easy to add onto existing energy retail models.  
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However, the possibility of more radical changes in energy retail markets cannot be excluded, with conventional 
aggregation of small user demand supplanted by virtual platforms and “peer-to-peer” trading, in the way that is 
increasingly familiar for services as diverse as taxis, second-hand goods and accommodation. In principle, these ICT-
enabled approaches could ultimately replace the wholesale market entirely (70). 
The value of electricity storage will rise in high renewables systems. Traditionally, pumped hydropower has been used 
for meeting peaks, but its potential is limited in the context of future balancing challenges (71). Gas has long been 
identified as a bridging fuel in decarbonisation, initially because of its relatively low carbon content (72) and more 
recently as a complement to renewables in power generation (73). Incumbent utilities, as well as new entrants, have 
moved into gas-fired generation in many countries since the 1990s. However, the long-term role of unabated gas is 
limited in very low carbon scenarios. Biomass and hydropower can play significant roles in some jurisdictions, but have 
constrained potential globally, and with the larger challenges in predominantly wind/solar systems (23,74), storage has 
several potential values, including wholesale market arbitrage, system services and grid support.  
Early applications of storage have been in high-power applications, notably for fast frequency response, with incumbents 
as the key actors due to their ability to manage large projects and operate in complex markets. While the economics of 
wholesale market arbitrage are also improving rapidly, the relative attractiveness of centralised storage and DS remains 
unclear, and will probably be dependent on the details of DG support mechanisms and distribution charging tariff 
structures (71). Based on the experience of PV investment, it seems highly likely that new entrants with new business 
models will be better placed than incumbents in distributed applications. The rapid deployment of batteries in electric 
vehicles (EV) opens up the prospect of new business models at the interface of transport and electricity systems. Existing 
EV lithium-ion battery technology may not prove ideal in grid applications, however, new technologies are possible (75) 
and the use of ‘post-vehicle life’ batteries offers an alternative business model.   
For the reasons set out above, it seems unlikely, that electro-chemical storage can address all the balancing issues 
associated with wind intermittency and seasonal demand. Chemical and thermal storage options are more plausible, but 
the short term business models associated with them are in technology development and demonstration rather than in the 
mass market.   
Collectively, distributed solutions imply billions of investments and the expected scale of demand side investment 
significantly exceeds that of new energy supply (1). The bulk of this will be in the relatively unglamorous areas of 
improving efficiency in buildings, transport and industry. Although there is some successful experience of energy 
companies diversifying into energy services offerings in the commercial and industrial sectors (76), it remains a relatively 
small market. Incumbent electricity system companies may be badly placed to undertake downstream financing, 
manufacturing, installation and operation, but that implies the need for new actors with new business models. Most 
investment has traditionally come from business and household users themselves. How this can be scaled to the required 
levels remains a challenge. 
11 
 
 
 
 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A. 
 
 
 
Institutions and governance 
There is significant concern about the ability of existing governance structures to enable rapid change, both with respect 
to climate mitigation in general (22) and in particular electricity systems in existing market models (77), including about 
the ability of existing arrangements to deliver the expected levels of investment, innovation and engagement (69). So it is 
clear that change is needed.  
There is no panacea as the institutional frameworks differ greatly across countries. Resource geographies differ 
substantially (78); approaches designed for monopoly utilities (e.g. in the USA) cannot be necessarily applied in 
competitive retail market structures (e.g. in Europe); most importantly the challenges of electricity access, affordability 
and organisational capacity faced by developing countries differ hugely from the issues that are grounded in well-
established power systems. Further research is required to address the governance implications of all these factors. 
However, it is clear that there are some important common factors across different systems.  
Already the penetration of technologies with very low marginal cost is leading to concerns about market incentives for 
adequate generation investment (26). Current responses by policymakers, for example incentives for new capacity, do not 
generally address the need for much greater flexibility to accommodate variable generation. Most existing flexible 
generation is not low carbon, pointing to the need for more emphasis on flexible demand, grid investment and storage 
(61). The prospect of a rapid shift to a high penetration of variable renewables adds to these concerns (79). The major 
investments required in flexibility lie outside the area of expertise of industry incumbents. Systems are increasingly 
complex, multi-scalar and variable in real-time (78). Some potential non-traditional business models, e.g. peer to peer 
trading, seem to imply radical changes in market structures, and therefore of governance.  
The political importance of the electricity sector is such that, even in liberalised energy markets, governments cannot 
relinquish influence over key strategic decisions. Where market rules and codes are set by incumbents, rapid change is 
problematic (80). Governance and regulatory systems will need to encourage innovation at rates historically unknown in 
the sector. Neither traditional integrated utilities, nor oligopolistic liberalised markets in electricity as a commodity are 
equipped to do this. Both renewable generation and its flexible complements are more distributed than existing 
centralised generation. Many new assets will be on the ‘customer side of the meter’, implying the need to engage billions 
of actors in a manner that assists system security and transition (81). This constitutes a major governance change.  
Theories of energy regulation since the ‘liberalisation’ agenda of the 1990s have focussed on incentivising cost reduction 
in networks and creating competition in generation (82) and (in some jurisdictions) retail of electricity as a commodity 
(83). In the context of requiring rapid change, decentralisation and greater flexibility, this is no longer fit for purpose. 
Public goods are now critical goals as well as private costs (84). Governance will need to enable low carbon innovation. 
In practice, this implies reform will need to enable change in the other three areas set out above. 
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In the grid infrastructure, the operators need to move from being passive ‘wires companies’ to become active operators of 
their local networks, essentially downscaling the idea of system operation to the distribution level (31). This will require 
use of ‘smart grid’ technology to address the increasing imbalances (spatial and temporal) across their networks as new 
technologies and practices are adopted (85). This implies major changes in regulatory objectives to promote innovation, 
whether the network is unbundled or part of a larger utility (77). And it will involve enabling network companies taking a 
more active role (either by investment or incentivisation) in DG, DR and DS approaches (86).  
For consumers and citizens, the over-arching need is to create a framework that reverses the historical trend towards the 
passivity and disengagement associated with commodity supply. Trust in energy institutions needs to be re-established. 
Market rules need to promote consumer engagement in the new flexible technologies. Governance structures need to 
allow for effective representation of the interests of communities (87), citizens and new market actors (70). 
Redesigning regulatory systems for new business models is not straightforward, but is essential. Consumer protection will 
remain important, but it needs to be proportionate. Routes for new business model approval should be transparent. And 
regulation should ensure non-profit organisations are treated appropriately rather than necessarily under the rules 
designed for profit-making enterprises.  
Over-arching all of these, the assumption that electricity systems are inevitably large-scale, and therefore appropriately 
governed at national or state level, needs to be revisited.     
Discussion  
We have introduced four categories of change in turn. The interdependence and interactions between these categories 
have become evident throughout. In this section we illustrate the need for whole-system consideration of these categories 
by way of an example. Demand response, efficiency and distributed generation have been referred to as cases with 
particular need for such a system wide approach. Here we will illustrate the multifaceted challenges and breadth of 
opportunities emerging from this perspective with the case of storage. Electricity storage, whether distributed or 
centralised, touches on all four of our categories.  
Governance of storage is still developing (88). Established structures have evolved for systems which operate efficiently 
without explicit provision of storage. Issues of generation, networks and demand tend to be addressed separately, whereas 
storage cuts across these domains (89). In some cases, this separation is such that regulation actively inhibits storage. 
Where storage is classified as a generator, network operators, for instance, can be actively prohibited from owning or 
operating storage. Opportunities exist to re-define the role of storage and thus encourage its uptake as an integral system 
component. 
Electricity markets have been developed predominantly to ensure the provision of energy, rather than storage per se. 
Business models therefore face a challenge of extracting value for storage from a range of markets (energy, capacity, 
response services) and non-markets (avoided infrastructure costs, long term system integration, operation and 
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decarbonisation costs). Efforts to allow storage and demand response to trade on 'a level playing field' alongside other 
generating assets, fail to recognise the integrating role such new solutions contribute to the wider system beyond mere 
'generation'. Fostering business models with this wider scope could unlock significant change in the provision, 
distribution and re-shaping of electricity demand through various forms of storage. 
The relationship of citizens with storage is multifaceted. Citizens could become owners and even operators of privately 
owned storage, if governance structures and new business models developed to make this an attractive option. 
The allocation of the collective cost/value of storage may however also pose challenges for equity, as mentioned in 
above. Without appropriate incentives, self-sufficient consumers with personal storage could withdraw support for 
collective system infrastructures, leading to a less efficient system where balancing takes place at an inappropriately small 
scale. 
Conversely, centralised large scale collective storage solutions and associated infrastructures, such as for hydrogen as a 
storage vector, pose similar challenges of equity. How should the cost be borne and distributed? To what extent should 
users of electricity with a load profile that heavily draws on storage be made to bear the cost, or those who mitigate the 
need for storage through more flexible demand patterns be rewarded? These questions lie at the interfaces of governance 
and business models, affecting citizens and infrastructure alike. 
Far from a purely technical challenge, storage emerges as one of many solutions for a rapidly decarbonising system, 
which benefit from the inclusion of human actors, be they in governance, business or civil society. The value of storage 
can be better understood in relation to the wider system and the benefit it brings to society. In this perspective governance 
structures play an important role in enabling new business models, which in turn could unlock new levels of citizen 
engagement or infrastructure development. 
Although there are huge socio-technical challenges, there are signs that we can be cautiously optimistic about addressing 
them. Generation and some infrastructure costs are falling, new businesses emerging, public engagement is strengthening, 
and in some places there are some effective policy drivers.  
Electricity will not be alone in facing these issues in a low carbon transition. There are analogies in systems that are more 
problematic for decarbonisation, for example transport systems (90,91) and food systems (92,93). Demand, lifestyle and 
social engagement in system change are common features.  
This paper has argued the inseparability of technical and social aspects of energy systems. Significant progress has been 
made with ‘stand alone’ technologies both in terms of cost and deployment. Looking forward, the role of civil society, 
businesses and governance in shaping the transition towards decarbonised electricity systems will become increasingly 
important. 
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Conclusions 
We have discussed four interacting components for a transition towards a low carbon electricity system: infrastructure, 
citizens, business models, and institutions and governance. The interactions between these components highlight the 
socio-technical nature of the system transition ahead. We have shown that this perspective highlights the new 
opportunities for rapid decarbonisation, but also raises issues that have not received sufficient attention in a 
predominantly technology-focussed discourse. 
The usual preoccupations of low carbon studies are the major uncertainties in technology performance and cost, but there 
are other equally significant determinants of system change. 
Electricity system scale and flexibility are likely to be critical and both involve decisions that are highly social in nature, 
relying as they do on complex commercial and operational arrangements as well as on the type and timing of activities 
that will be promoted or discouraged. Storage of various kinds is likely to be very important, and the required scale, 
location, durations and other performance requirements are strongly dependent on wider system flexibility, including the 
availability of demand response. The technical potential of demand response is clearly large however the adoption and 
realisation of this potential depends on social factors, some of which currently do not form part of energy policy. The 
practical (i.e. socio-technical) potential has been the subject of conjecture but, as yet, remains uncertain.  
Feasibility of a rapid low carbon transition will depend on development of the human part of the energy system as least as 
much as its technical components, notably on smart grid deployment, electricity business model change, engagement of 
electricity users and governance arrangements. The relative roles of distributed and centralised actors are not yet clear, 
but significant decentralisation seems inevitable. The implication is that although there are some geo-political constraints 
on energy transition, there is much scope for national and sub-national action, not least where electricity systems are 
concerned. This seems consistent with Paris Agreement approach of using Nationally Determined Contributions. 
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